Why was the prewar intelligence on Iraq wrong, and who bears responsibility?
The administration’s case for war rested heavily on assessments that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program. After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group found no stockpiles. The presidential commission on intelligence capabilities concluded in 2005 that the intelligence community “was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,” and that it had found “no indication that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence”; it noted that it had not been authorized to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence.
The administration and its defenders
Defenders argue that the failure was one of intelligence, not honesty: the same judgments were shared by the previous administration, by allied services and by many members of Congress who voted for the 2002 authorization, and Saddam Hussein’s defiance of United Nations inspections made the threat reasonable to act on after September 11.
Critics
Critics, including many Democrats who later regretted their votes, argue that officials presented uncertain and disputed intelligence with unwarranted confidence and emphasized ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda that the evidence did not support.
Conservative skeptics of the war
Some conservatives—realists and paleoconservatives among them—opposed the invasion from the start, arguing that nation-building in the Middle East was at odds with conservative prudence and American interests. Their critique gained influence in the party in later years.
Sources
- Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction · GovInfo, U.S. Government Publishing Office

